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Abstract 
Scholarly interest in the relationship between open strategies and innovation 
performance has been unfailing, and in recent years has even increased. The 
present paper focuses on inbound open strategies and reviews various approaches 
(transaction costs, competences, open innovation) dealing with firms´ decisions 
about these strategies. The different approaches result in different conclusions about 
the optimum level of openness. The different approaches are tested empirically 
taking account of the different degrees of openness (closed, semiopen, open, 
ultraopen) and their effects on sales of new–to-the-market products, and using a 
panel of Spanish firms from a CIS-type survey for 2004-2008. Our results show that 
closed and semiopen strategies are the most common among Spanish firms and that 
open strategies produce the best performance, while semiopen strategies are more 
effective than closed ones. These results hold across different subsamples based on 
firm size and industry, and are robust to different ways of defining the indicators and 
to different estimation methods. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between the utilization of external sources of knowledge and 
innovative performance has been a traditional area of interest for academics, 
managers and policy makers (Mowery, 1983; Freeman, 1991; 1994). It is beginning 
to attract even more research attention with some authors claiming that firms are 
switching from a model of closed innovation to an open strategy (Chesbrough, 2003; 
2006). The evidence for this claim is mainly qualitative and based on the so-called 
‘high technology’ industries and on US companies (Chesbrough, 2006; van de 
Vrande et al., 2009). Although some analyses use large databases covering several 
sectors and several different countries (van de Vrande et al., 2009; Barge-Gil, 2010a; 
2010b), they focus on the determinants of the different open strategies followed by 
firms, but not on their effects. Several scholars (West et al., 2006; Spithoven et al., 
2010; Lichtenthaler, 2011) have highlighted the fact that few studies focus on the 
effects of different open strategies on firm performance. The question of how 
openness influences the ability of firms to innovate and benefit from innovation is at 
the heart of innovation research (Dahlander and Gann, 2010) and measuring 
openness empirically is becoming increasingly important (Gassman et al., 2010). 
In this paper, we focus on inbound open strategies, developed through formal 
relationships. That is, we link to a research tradition that focuses on analysing the 
effect of formal ties with external partner, on innovation performance (see e.g., 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1996; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Mohnen et al., 2006). 
However, these studies focus mainly on the occurrence (not on the differing degrees) 
of linkages, which limits the knowledge in this area (Freel and de Jong, 2009; 
Tomlinson, 2010; Barge-Gil, 2010b).  
More precisely, it is crucial to find the right balance between internal and external 
sources of innovation (Foss, 2003; Dahlander and Gann, 2010), since openness is 
not a binary classification (Chesbrough, 2003; Huizingh, 2010), and open strategies 
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can be more or less enduring and intensive and involve more or less resource 
sharing and commitment (Freel and de Jong, 2009). Accordingly, operationalization 
of the degree of openness has moved on to the research agenda (Elmquist et al., 
2009; Knudsen and Mortensen, 2010; Lichtenthaler, 2011).  
From a theoretical point of view, the open innovation (OI) approach is closely coupled 
to a broader debate on firm boundaries (Dahlander and Gann, 2010), which links it to 
transaction cost and competences approaches. All these approaches deal with firms´ 
decisions about openness. However, they reach different conclusions about the 
optimal level of openness, thus providing contradictory guidance for practitioners. 
This situation makes it crucial to advance empirical analysis of the relationship 
between different degrees of openness and innovation performance.  
In this paper, we empirically test the approaches in the literature by analysing the 
effect of different degrees of openness on firms´ product innovation outcomes. The 
study highlights a number of important features. 
First, we use data from the Innovation Panel developed by the Spanish Institute of 
Statistics (PITEC) for the period 2004-2008, which was built on the responses to the 
Spanish part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The PITEC database is very 
powerful and provides data for a large sample of firms over the five years 2004 to 
2008. Its panel structure enables panel data techniques which control for individual 
unobservable heterogeneity not controlled for using cross sectional data. Our data 
provide quantitative evidence on the OI strategies of firms in all manufacturing 
sectors in a non-US context.  
Second, we combine information gleaned from the responses to different questions 
in the survey to generate a measure of degree of openness, which allows us to 
distinguish among four different strategies: closed, semiopen, open and ultraopen. 
Since the survey is CIS-based, this measure can be replicated in other countries, 
which will enable the development of stylized facts.  
 3
Third, we use parametric techniques including single equation and two-part models, 
and semiparametric techniques including quantile regression, which allow us to 
evaluate the impact of openness strategies both for average firms and for different 
points on the outcomes distribution. 
Fourth, we show that the results hold across different subsamples based on firm size 
and industry, giving generalizability to the findings.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the different theoretical 
approaches and derives some hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the empirical results 
from other studies that analyse openness using CIS-type data. Section 4 describes 
the database and variables and explains the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents 
the results which are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 offers some conclusions. 
2. The theoretical approaches 
This section looks at the relationship between open strategies and innovation, 
according to different approaches: transaction costs, competences, and OI. A very 
important point is that the different approaches reach different conclusions, leading to 
the formulation of opposing hypotheses. These controversies in the theory call for 
more empirical research. 
2.1. Transaction costs 
Transactions cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1979; 1981; 1991) provides a 
framework to understand the decisions of firms related to conducting an activity in-
house or externally. TCE theory was proposed originally to explain why firms exist, 
and is based on the idea of minimizing costs: a firm will choose to be open if the cost 
of externalizing an activity is lower than the cost of performing it within the firm. There 
are three main types of costs of externalizing activities (transactions costs): the costs 
of potential opportunistic behaviour from other agents; coordination costs; and, in the 
case of innovation, unintended knowledge leakages (Ozman, 2009). On this basis, 
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there are three key elements that influence the decision about whether to conduct an 
activity internally or externally: asset specificity; uncertainty; and scale economies 
(Williamson, 1979; 2010; Robertson and Gatignon, 1998)  
Asset specificity is the most important dimension in a transaction (Williamson, 1981) 
and signals whether or not a ‘transaction-specific` investment is warranted. 
Transaction specific investments cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or users 
without loss of value (Williamson, 1985). Partners signing a contract that involves 
transaction specific investment are embarking on a relationship of mutual 
dependence where market forces cannot easily punish opportunism or maladaptation 
(Robertson and Gatignon, 1998). For this reason, the need for transaction-specific 
investment is usually decisive in the firm’s choice to carry out the activity internally.  
When uncertainty is high, this means that unforeseen circumstances are likely to 
arise during the execution of the activities, potentially leading to conflict. If the activity 
is conducted in house, adaptations to original expectations can be made sequentially 
without the need for wide consultation or revision of interfirm agreements; conflicts 
can be resolved based on in-firm hierarchy (Williamson, 1979; 1981). 
Scale economies are usually the result of external agents aggregating demand 
leading to a reduction in production costs, making the choice to externalize more 
attractive for the firm (Love and Roper, 2005). Scale economies will only be available 
if products, at least to some degree, are standardized. If there are no scale 
economies, then it is more likely that the firm will decide to conduct the activity 
internally. 
Innovation usually involves investment in specific assets, major technical and 
economic uncertainty and few scale economies because of the level of specificity 
and creativity involved. In the context of product innovation, this may make the 
transactions costs prohibitive (Lundvall, 1993). In addition, TCE treats external 
sourcing and internal development as substitutes (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999); 
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thus, predicting that a closed strategy is the most successful to develop innovation 
(Lundvall, 1993; Galende, 2006).  
HIP 1: Closed strategies will be the most conducive to innovation success 
2.2. The competences approach 
Delmas (1999) highlights that TCE was formulated in an environment of mature 
physical capital-intensive industries and its application in environments where know-
how is the key asset and where building rather than protecting specific assets is the 
main issue, may be limited. TCE is often criticized as being inappropriate in dealing 
with innovation (Lundvall, 1993; Foss and Klein, 2010) where learning is central to 
the process; critics claim that TCE focuses on minimizing costs and does not pay 
sufficient attention to learning. Williamson (1985; 1991) did acknowledge that TCE 
requires some adaptation to deal with the innovation process. In other words, the 
focus on cost in TCE does not recognize the differential value to be gained from 
being open (Madhok and Tallman, 1998) because it assumes uniform results from 
different governance modes (Hodgson, 1998; Noteboom, 2004), an assumption that 
is not made in the competences approach. 
The competences approach builds on the resource-based view of the firm. It 
assumes that core resources are scarce, valuable, imperfectly imitable and lacking 
direct substitutes, so that competitive advantage is sustained (Barney, 1991). As the 
competences approach has evolved, the emphasis on capabilities and competences 
has increased with a reduced focus on pure resources (Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2009). Capabilities are considered to be more important strategically than transaction 
costs (Noteboom, 2004): the firm’s ability to foster human learning, technological 
innovation and research and development (R&D) in a context of uncertainty may be 
crucial for firm survival and a major reason why firms exist (Hodgson, 1998) 
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Within the competences perspective there are some arguments favouring openness, 
especially maximizing firm value through the pooling and utilization of valuable 
resources (Das and Teng, 2000). The key point in this argument is that firms have 
heterogeneous technological capabilities whose combination can make success 
more likely and can foster the accumulation of resources and learning (Sakakibara, 
1997). Openness also makes organizations more flexible by enabling reversibility, 
which is very important since the failure rate among research projects is high (Narula, 
2001). 
However, there are also strong arguments for keeping activities internal. Most of the 
competences required for R&D are specific to the organization and are usually non 
tradeable (Barney, 1991; Sakakibara, 1997). Teece (1988) for example, highlights 
the importance of close communication between the innovation process and 
manufacturing, which means that its results are more likely to meet the specific 
needs of the firm if the innovation activity is performed internally (Beneito, 2003; 
2006). Innovation capabilities do not accrue from skilfulness in exploiting external 
technologies, which are accessible also to competitors and therefore not sufficient to 
sustain competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). They accumulate as the result of in-
house innovation, which implies the possession of heterogeneous and specific 
technological resources and the capability to generate new resources and build basic 
technological competence (Galende, 2006). Being closed enables firms to exploit the 
cumulativeness and complexity of their technological knowledge, reduce the 
uncertainty of the innovation search through the use of routines (Dosi, 1988) and 
protect their knowledge through greater control over spillovers. Another argument for 
integration from the competences perspective is that outsourcing can result in the 
dissipation of a capability that later turns out to be crucial for the utilization or 
replacement of elements of the firm’s core competence (Noteboom, 2004).  
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These aspects are the basis of claims that firms should concentrate on doing in 
house those activities at which they excel (core activities) (Hodgson, 1998; 
Noteboom, 2004) and on more strategic knowledge in order to guard against 
unintended outflows or leakages (Cassiman and Valentini, 2009), and to outsource 
only ‘non-core’ activities or those in which they are not particularly specialized 
(Mowery, 1983; Mol, 2005). In other words, although exploiting external sources 
provides useful knowledge, a firm’s product innovation processes need to be 
primarily internal (Oerlemans et al., 1998; Vega-Jurado et al., 2009). Firms retaining 
core innovation processes in house while adopting an open strategy for other 
activities can be described as using a ‘semiopen’ strategy (Barge-Gil, 2010b). 
HIP 2: Semiopen strategies are the most conducive to innovation success. 
2.3. Open innovation 
The OI approach takes a different view. The key to OI is that external ideas and 
external paths to market are assigned the same level of importance as internal ideas 
and internal paths to market (Chesbrough 2006, page 1, italics are ours), and co-
development of innovation is an important activity (Chesbrough and Schwartz, 2007). 
Firms are aware that only a small proportion of innovative people are employed in 
house, and that a lot of unique knowledge and abilities lie outside firm boundaries 
and internal R&D departments (Chesbrough 2003), but can be accessed through 
collaborations arrangements between firms and outside actors (Elmquist et al., 
2009). Recent empirical evidence is challenging earlier approaches to innovation 
(Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). For example, Cisco is regarded as one of the 
world’s most innovative companies, although it does very little research in house and 
acquires most of its technology from external sources (Gassmann, 2006). The story 
of its competition with Lucent is one of the outstanding examples of this new 
paradigm (Chesbrough 2003). Chesbrough (2006) shows that quantitatively the 
weight of small and medium sized enterprises (SME) in R&D spending and patents 
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has grown considerably, showing that knowledge is increasingly distributed and 
providing evidence that firms should adapt to this new situation. It is suggested that 
more and more managers are discovering the value of openness for higher 
innovation rates and radically new product innovations, not just cost savings 
(Gassmann, 2006; Mazzanti et al., 2009).  
Several factors have contributed to popularity and importance of OI (Chesbrough, 
2007, Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Dahlander and Gann, 2010): (i) changes in 
working patterns, in which professionals seek portfolio careers rather than jobs for 
life, and work contexts that involve increasing division of labour; (ii) improved market 
institutions (property rights, venture capitalists, standards) are enabling increased 
trading of knowledge; (iii) new technologies which ease coordination across 
geographical distance; and (iv) the high costs of technological development and 
shorter product life cycles which make it harder for companies to justify large internal 
investments. 
The main argument for the importance of OI is its power to create value, which is 
related to the inherent characteristics of knowledge that it can be reused and can 
lead to increasing returns (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). In addition, it is often 
not possible (or would be extremely costly and risky) to develop the knowledge 
internally (Lichtenthaler, 2008), making openness unavoidable. Thus, external 
resources are becoming part of the firm’s knowledge base (Witzeman et al., 2006). 
HIP3: Open strategies are the most conducive to innovation success. 
Finally, some authors highlight that organizations need to guard against a preference 
for outsiders, which makes them waste detailed and available internal knowledge in 
the pursuit of less rich external knowledge (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003). 1  Even 
proponents of OI warn that too much openness can have a negative impact on 
                                                
1 Structure of incentives inside of organizations (internal competition) and the greater scrutiny over 
internal knowledge could explain this behaviour (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003). 
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companies’ innovation success (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Enkel et al., 
2009). Too much external knowledge can be damaging for four reasons. First, it 
could lead to loss of control and loss of core competences (Enkel et al,. 2009), 
especially when partners engage in “learning races” where relationships dissolve 
after one partner aggressively extracts knowledge from the other partner 
(Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). Second, sustaining a business model requires 
that a portion of the value created for innovation is captured; therefore, an effective 
open strategy must find a balance between value capture and value creation 
(Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). Third, too much openness can give place to 
over-searching and coordination problems (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006; Lazzarotti and Manzini, 2009). Fourth, some authors warn that greater 
external openness could damage the openness within the firm (Trott and Hartman, 
2009; Knudsen and Mortensen, 2010) and negatively affect the morale of internal 
knowledge producers (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003). Accordingly, there can be too much 
openness, a finding that has been corroborated by academic research that the costs 
of maintaining networks increases greatly when networks pass a certain size 
(Hansen, 1999), resulting in reduced performance (Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
HIP4: Ultra-open strategies are less conducive to innovation success. 
To sum up, the different approaches predict that different degrees of openness may 
be more or less conducive to innovation success. This fact points to the importance 
of empirical exploration of the relationship between open strategies and innovation 
performance, which is the main goal in this paper. 
3. Previous empirical work 
Before presenting our empirical study, we are going to revise the previous empirical 
literature. There is a research tradition that focuses on analysing the effects of firms’  
inbound openness using large datasets (Karlsson, 1997; Oerlemans et al., 1998; 
 10
Koschatzky, 1998; Love and Roper, 1999; Vega-Jurado et al., 2009). In recent years, 
many studies on this topic have used CIS-type survey data. CIS survey data are 
popular for analysing innovation because (i) they follow the Oslo and Frascati manual 
guidelines, which are the result of years of work conducted by different scholars and 
practitioners, (ii) they allow comparable indicators to analyse intercountry and 
intertemporal differences and develop robust empirical evidence, and (iii) they are 
usually conducted by national statistics offices which are experienced at data 
gathering, and conduct extensive pre-testing and piloting to check interpretability, 
reliability and validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
Commonly used indicators of innovation outcome based on CIS data include 
percentage sales of products that are new to the market or to the firm or significantly 
improved compared to sales of other products. A review of the advantages and 
disadvantages of such indicators and some of the studies that employ them is 
provided by Vasquez-Urriago et al. (2011). Their main advantages are that they 
provide a measure of the economic success of innovations, are applicable to all 
sectors, allow types of innovations to be distinguished, and allow the definition of 
continuous variables, which contribute to the development of econometric analyses 
(Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Negassi, 2004). Their limitations are that they are sensitive 
to product life cycles and markets, which may differ in the context of competing 
companies (Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2009). 
Table 1 presents studies analysing the effect of openness, based on these 
indicators2 . All these studies use CIS-type data and some indicator of the firm’s 
general strategy in relation to inbound openness (analyses of the effect of openness 
with specific types of partners or of spillovers are excluded).3  Even within these 
                                                
2 We restrict the analysis to those works published in journals, although there are also some working 
papers and book chapters dealing with this issue. 
 
3 Some studies use indicators for formal links and for “general utilization” (not necessarily involving 
formal links). We show only the indicators related to formal links. E.g., Laursen and Salter  (2006) focus 
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parameters we can see that the empirical evidence is far from conclusive. Some 
studies find the existence of a positive effect (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Caloghirou 
et al., 2004; Faems et al., 2005; Laursen and Salter, 2006) or no effect (Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht, 1996; Aschoff and Schmidt, 2008; Frenz and Ietto-Gilles, 2009; 
Spithoven et al., 2010), and some find a mixture of both, depending on the method of 
estimation (Klomp and van Leuween, 2001; Negassi, 2004), the sector analysed 
(Mohnen et al., 2006; Raymond et al., 2006) or the indicator for openness (Fosfuri 
and Tribo, 2008).  
We would emphasize that, despite being very selective in terms of the studies 
reviewed, they present many methodological differences, in terms mainly of sample 
selection, estimation methods and definition of the indicators. Sample size also 
varies a lot. These differences make it difficult to develop robust empirical evidence. 
We can say only that openness is not shown to have a negative effect on sales of 
product innovations and that the existence or not of a positive effect of openness on 
results is contingent on the individual study (although there do not seem to be direct 
associations between the choices made and the results obtained, the effect of 
openness tends to be more positive if only the manufacturing sectors are included). 
This lack of empirical robustness is at the root of the claims of some authors that the 
effect of openness on firms’ innovation outcomes should receive greater attention 
and should take account of the different degrees of openness (West et al., 2006; 
Enkel et al., 2009; Spithoven et al., 2010, Knudsen and Mortensen, 2010). This call 
for more research would seem justified in an era when open innovation is attracting 
increased interest, especially from firm managers.  
 
 
mainly on the depth and breadth of open innovation in terms of “general utilization”; we do not include 
this part of their analysis in this review. 
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Table 1. Review of previous empirical studies 
Authors Dataa Sample Sample Selection Methodology Dependent Variableb 
Independent 
variables Effect 
% n_firm No effect Brouwer, Kleinknecht  
(1996) CIS1 Netherlands 1992 3,505 
Innovators 
(corrected) Generalized Tobit % n_market 
Dummy acquisition 
external knowledge No effect 
OLS Positive 
Heckman No effect Klomp, Van Leeuwen (2001) CIS2  Netherlands 1996 3,059 
Innovators 
(corrected) 
FIML 
Latent logit share % 
n_general Dummy cooperation 
No effect 
Miotti, Sachwald (2003) CIS2  France 1996 4,215 Manufacturing nd % n_general Dummy cooperation Positive 
Fixed Effects No effect 
Random Effects Positive 
2SLS Positive Negassi (2004) 
CIS 1 and 2  France (1992 
and 1996) 
3,801x 7 years 
(Panel) Manufacturing 
Tobit 
LVA n_general L VA cooperation and contracting (t-1) 
Positive 
Caloghirou et al. (2004) KNOW 2000 (7 countries) 558 Innovators and 5 sectors OLS % n_general 
Dummy strategic 
alliance Positive 
Faems et al. (2005) CIS 2 Belgium 1996 221 Manufacturing, innovators Tobit % n_general 
Number of different 
type of partners Positive 
Mohnen et al. (2006) CIS 1 (7 countries) 8146 
Manufacturing, 
innovators 
(corrected) 
Generalized Tobit Latent logit share% n_general Dummy cooperation 
Positive (HT) 
No effect (LT) 
L % n_market Positive 
L % n_firm Positive 
L % improved firm 
Dummy cooperation 
Positive Laursen, Salter (2006) CIS 3 UK 2000  2,707 Manufacturing Tobit 
L % n_market Number of different type of partners Inverted U 
CIS 2  Netherlands 1996 3,294 Positive (HT) No effect (LT) 
CIS 2,5  Netherlands 1998 3,220 Positive (HT and LT) Raymond et al. (2006) 
CIS 3 Netherlands 2000 2,104 
Manufacturing, 
innovators 
(corrected) 
Generalized Tobit Latent logit share% n_general Dummy cooperation 
Positive (HT and LT) 
% n_market No effect Aschhoff, Schmidt 
(2008) CIS Germany 2004 and 2005 699 Innovators 
Lower bound 
heterocedastic Tobit % n_firm 
Dummy cooperation 
(t-1) No effect 
Dummy cooperation No effect 
Fosfuri, Tribó (2008) CIS 3 Spain 2000 2,464 With innovation expenses OLS % n_general Dummy external R&D Positive 
OLS No effect Frenz, Ietto-Gillies 
(2009) 
CIS 2 and 3 UK (1998 and 
2000) 679 
Innovators 
(corrected) Heckman L P n_general 
Dummy cooperation 
(t-1) No effect 
OLS No effect 
2SLS No effect Spithoven et al. (2010) CIS 3 Belgium (2000) 724 Innovators (both corrected and not) 
Tobit 
L % n_general Dummy cooperation 
No effect 
a Some of them jointly with other surveys b(%) Share of ___ in firm’s total sales; (L) Logarithm; (VA) Absolute Value of ___ (P) productivity: value per employee; (n_firm) New products to firm; 
(n_market) New products to firm’s market; (n_general). 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
4.1. Database 
We use PITEC (2004-2008) data. PITEC is a statistical instrument for studying the 
innovation activities of Spanish firms over time. The PITEC database is compiled by 
INE, the Spanish National Statistics Institute, and sponsored by FECYT and COTEC 
advisory groups of university researchers. It is developed from the R&D and 
technological innovation surveys of Spanish firms, which makes it a CIS-type survey. 
Although PITEC started in 2003 we cannot use data from that year because some 
questions were framed in such a way as to make it impossible to derive indicators 
similar to those for the rest of the period. The PITEC sample is composed of various 
subsamples. In 2003, two subsamples were defined: one composed of all firms with 
200 or more employees, and the other composed of all firms performing internal 
R&D. In subsequent years, some firms with different characteristics were included. 
Quantitative variables are anonymized..4  
The current analysis is restricted to all innovating firms in the manufacturing sectors 
performing R&D in at least one year of the sample period (2004-2008). The 
construction of the database dictates that it is representative only of R&D performers. 
Our focus on the manufacturing sectors is because product innovation in services 
has several differential features (Sirilli and Evangelista, 1998; Pires et al., 2008). This 
strategy has the advantage that we do not have sample selection among these firms 
(all firms with these characteristics are included), but the disadvantage that our 
results cannot be extended to the whole population of firms. The last column in Table 
2 shows the yearly composition of the final sample.  
                                                
4  More information on the database and its anonymization can be found at 
http://sise.fecyt.es/Estudios/PITEC.asp (in English). 
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4.2. Definition of the variables 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
Definitions of all the variables are provided in Table 3. Following previous studies 
using CIS-type survey data, our dependent variable is the percentage of sales 
obtained in the last year of the period of analysis, from products new to the market, 
introduced in the previous three years. Our indicator is LNEWMK, being LNEWMK=ln 
(NEWMK), where NEWMK is the weight of sales of new to the market products, 
expressed as one per thousand. If NEWMK is equal to zero, then LNEWMK is equal 
to zero. In the robustness check section (5.2) other indicators will be explored. 
4.2.2. Independent variables 
Our independent variables are four dummy variables that capture the firm’s 
openness strategy. We develop these variables by combining the responses to 
several different survey questions.5 
First, we start by labelling those firms declaring neither collaboration for innovation 
nor buying external R&D. These firms do not show any formal links related to 
inbound open innovation and, therefore, are considered CLOSED. According to the 
transaction costs approach, this is the best choice and will allow these firms to 
perform better. 
Second, we distinguish different degrees of openness among those declaring some 
formal link. We exploit the responses to another question in the innovation survey: 
‘How were the new products developed?’ There are three possible answers: mainly 
by the enterprise; mainly through co-operation with other enterprises or institutions; 
mainly by other enterprises or institutions. Respondents were asked to choose one of 
these. In our view, this information allows us to derive indicators for different degrees 
of openness, in line with the different theoretical approaches. 
                                                
5 We adapt the definitions in Barge-Gil (2010b). 
 15
Firms indicating formal links for inbound open innovation, but declaring that new 
products were obtained mainly by the enterprise on its own, are regarded as 
SEMIOPEN. They use external sources, but retain the bulk of the process in house. 
According to the competence approach, this is the best choice and these firms will 
achieve higher performance. 
Firms indicating formal links for inbound open innovation and declaring that new 
products were achieved mainly through co-operation with other organizations are 
regarded as OPEN. They conform to the main distinguishing feature of open 
innovation, that is, that internal and external sources of knowledge are equally 
important. According to the open innovation approach, this is the best choice and will 
enable higher performance. 
Finally, firms whose new products are the result predominantly of the efforts of third 
parties are regarded as ULTRAOPEN. For these firms, external sources are more 
important than internal sources for new products. Many authors warn about the risks 
in such a strategy; we want to test whether it is such a bad choice. 
Table 2 shows the relative frequency of the different strategies in the period 
considered. We see that both the transaction cost and the competences approaches 
seem to perform well in explaining firm behaviour accounting respectively for 44.1% 
and 40.8% of the whole sample (open innovators 12.7% and ultraopen 2.3%). We 
see also that closed strategies are becoming more common: their weight has been 
increasing yearly, from 37.9% in 2004 to 47.5% in 2008, while semiopen strategies 
are becoming less popular, from 45.7% in 2004 to 37.6% in 2008. Table 2 shows 
also that open strategies are less important, decreasing from 14.7% in 2004 to 12.2% 
in 2008, and that ultraopen strategies increased from 1.7% to 2.7%.6 That is, we do 
not observe increased firm openness despite claims that more firms are increasingly 
                                                
6 This apparent high relative growth of ultraopen innovators in absolute numbers is a jump from 49 to 
89.  
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adopting open innovation strategies. At least for Spanish innovators performing R&D 
in the manufacturing sectors, this would seem not to be the case. 
Table 2. Open strategies by year 
 CLOSED SEMIOPEN OPEN ULTRAOPEN TOTAL 
2004 37,87% 45,70% 14,74% 1,68% 2,910 
2005 43,13% 41,17% 13,57% 2,13% 3,707 
2006 44,70% 40,92% 12,11% 2,27% 3,649 
2007 46,73% 39,33% 11,13% 2,80% 3,323 
2008 47,54% 37,59% 12,18% 2,68% 3,317 
Total 44,14% 40,83% 12,71% 2,32% 16,906 
 
4.2.3. Control variables 
As control variables, and following the studies reviewed in section 3, we use firm 
size, R&D intensity, sector,7 export behaviour, obstacles to innovation, and belonging 
to a group. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Table 3. 
4.4. The model and estimation issues 
Our specification estimates innovation output using as dependent variables a set of 
dummies reflecting the different strategies chosen by the firm together with a vector 
of controls: 
),3,2,1, ittiittititi ZULTRAOPENOPENSEMIOPENaI εϕααα +++++=  
where CLOSED is used as the reference category. 
A first estimation issue is that we have a panel data structure, which allows us to 
control for unobservable individual heterogeneity. This has been shown empirically to 
have an effect on the firm’s decision to invest in innovation (Peters, 2009; Griffiths 
and Webster, 2010) and, arguably, could affect the relationship between openness 
strategy and innovation outcome. Taking account of such individual heterogeneity is 
done by decomposing the error itε  in two different components: , which is time 
invariant and . 
ic
itu
                                                
7 For sector, we use the OECD (2005) classification. We tried sectoral dummies and the results (not 
reported here for reasons of space) were very similar.  
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In this work we combine panel data and pooled data analysis for comparative 
purposes. 
Table 3. Definition of variables, mean and standard deviation 
LABEL DESCRIPTION MEAN SD 
LNEWMK Log of (NEWMK). NEWMK is the yearly weight of sales from new to the 
market product (introduced in the previous 3 years) over total sales, expressed 
as 1 in 1,000 2.78 2.64 
CLOSED Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has neither cooperated nor 
bought external R&D 0.44 0.50 
SEMIOPEN Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm cooperated or bought 
external R&D but declare having developed their product innovations mainly 
through internal efforts 0.41 0.49 
OPEN Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has developed their product 
innovations mainly through joint efforts with other entities 0.13 0.33 
ULTRAOPEN Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm declares that their product 
innovations have been mainly by third parties 0.02 0.15 
LSIZE Log of number of employees 4.16 1.32 
LSIZE2 Square of LSIZE 19.04 11.92 
RD_INT R&D staff/Total number of employees 5.75 2.62 
LT Variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to the following sectors: 
food, beverages and tobacco, textile and clothing, wood products, paper and 
printing. 0.25 0.43 
LMT Variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to the following sectors: 
petroleum refining, rubber and plastic products, non-metallic mineral 
products, ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding and other 
manufacturing. 0.23 0.42 
MHT Variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to the following sectors: 
chemicals, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, motor vehicles and 
other transport equipment. 0.39 0.49 
HT Variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to the following sectors: 
pharmaceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft, medical, precision and optical 
instruments, radio, television and communication equipment and office, 
accounting and computing machinery. 0.13 0.33 
EXPORT Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm has sales outside Spain 0.83 0.37 
OBS_COST Sum of the scores for the following obstacles to innovation: lack of internal 
funds; lack of external funds; very high innovation costs; and demand 
uncertainty. Rescaled between 0 (not relevant) and 1 (highly relevant) 0.61 0.29 
OBS_INF Sum of the scores for the following obstacles to innovation: lack of qualified 
personnel; lack of information on technology; lack of information on markets; 
problems to find partners. Rescaled between 0 (not relevant) and 1 (highly 
relevant) 0.42 0.24 
GROUP Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm belongs to a group 0.38 0.49 
 
A second estimation issue is related to the characteristics of our dependent variable. 
Firms can have zero sales from new to the market products. We still can model their 
results using just one equation, as it has been done in several of the empirical 
analysis reviewed in Section 3 (Negassi, 2004, Faems et al., 2005; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006). However, a two part model can also be applied. This is developed in 
two steps: (i) the likelihood of obtaining any new to the market product is analysed for 
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the whole sample, and (ii) the weight of these products over total sales is analysed 
for the subsample of new to the market innovators. This method shows the 
advantage of allowing different mechanisms to determine the likelihood of obtaining 
new to the market products and the percentage of sales from these products 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Third, we could use a generalized 
Tobit. This model assumes that we cannot observe the sales from new to the market 
products of non-innovators, so it treats zeros as missing values. This means that 
there is a selection bias. This indicates that a two-step method would be the most 
appropriate, but allowing for dependence between steps following a Heckman 
procedure. This is the method used in Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996), Mohnen et 
al. (2006) and Raymond et al. (2006). In the present work we will concentrate on the 
two former methods. An attempt was made to explore the generalized Tobit and the 
results show clearly that both equations are independent, which calls for a two part 
model.8 Some authors explicitly state that in the case of the dependent variable used 
here the zeros observed are true zeros and not missing values (Mairesse and 
Mohnen, 2010), again indicating the appropriateness of a two part model. 
A third issue is that dependent variables are limited (they are censored or dummy 
variables). Many econometrics textbooks argue that non linear models, such as Tobit 
or Probit should be applied in this situation. The main advantage of these models if 
that the predicted values are in the right intervals. However, as Angrist and Pischke 
(2008) highlight, if we are interested in the effect of some regressors instead of in 
predicting, then OLS can be used. In fact, when using Tobit or Probit, marginal 
effects should be computed to obtain this effect. In practice, these are close to OLS 
coefficients when covariates are fixed at mean values. We employed both OLS and 
non linear models. We will report here the OLS results, which have the advantage of 
                                                
8 Results (not reported here, but are available upon request from the authors) were very similar to those 
presented here, whether identification relies only on the functional form or on the regional distribution of 
innovation expenses are used for identification purposes. 
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being standard, easier to compute and allow for exploring fixed effects in panel 
models9. 
A fourth issue is that innovation returns are very skewed (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000; 
Marsili and Salter, 2005; Ebersberger et al., 2008; 2010) so that average-based 
methods give a biased picture and we need to pay attention to the extreme points in 
the distribution (McKelvey and Andriani, 2005). Quantile regression is a good tool. It 
examines conditional changes in different points of the distribution by minimizing a 
weighted sum of absolute deviations. It was proposed by Koenker and Basset (1978) 
and is described in detail in Buchinsky (1998). Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue that 
the coefficients of regressors from the second part of the two part model explained 
above are downward biased if the coefficients of these regressors are positive in the 
first part, so that a better way to address the estimation of censored variables is 
quantile regression. We explore the relationship for three different points in the 
distribution: the fifth decile (median), representing low innovation (but positive) 
intensity (LI); the seventh decile, representing median innovation intensity (MI) and 
the ninth decile, representing high innovation intensity (HI).10 The fifth decile is the 
first decile with positive value of sales of new to the market products (2%); in seventh 
decile this rises to 12.9% and in the ninth decile it is 50%. 
5. Results 
5.1. Main results 
Table 5 shows the main results of the analysis. Random effects panel data results 
are provided in columns I-III. Column I shows the results for the single equation 
model, column II shows the first part equation and column III shows the second part 
of the two part model. The same scheme applies to the pooled regressions (columns 
                                                
9All findings hold when non linear models are employed. Results are available upon request from the 
authors. 
10 Note that quantile coefficients tell us about the effects on distributions not individual firms. Usually 
individual firms are not stable in the same point of the distribution (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
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IV-VI). Finally, quantile regression for the fifth, seventh and ninth deciles are shown 
in columns VII-IX. The Wald tests comparing the coefficients of the different 
strategies are shown below the regressions. 
A first general view is provided in columns I and IV for the panel and pooled data, 
respectively. Results are very significant from a statistical point of view. An open 
strategy yields the highest payoff, while being semiopen is better than being closed. 
These results are robust to the consideration of panel or pooled data. Magnitude of 
the coefficients deserves a comment. In the more conservative panel estimations11, 
an open strategy has 40 log points (around 49%) higher percentage of sales from 
new to the market products, compared to a close strategy. A semiopen strategy has 
22 log points (around 24.6%) higher percentage of sales of new to the market 
products than a closed strategy. 
A more detailed picture is provided by the information in the two part model (columns 
II-III for panel data and columns V-VI for pooled data). They show that results in 
colunms I-IV were driven mainly by the influence of the different strategies upon the 
likelihood of obtaining a new to the market product. Thus, the first part reflect the 
same pattern as the single equation model, since the coefficient of an open strategy 
is the highest and a semiopen strategy is shown to be significantly better than a 
closed strategy. In the panel regression, an open strategy increases the likelihood of 
obtaining a new to the market product by 8 percentage points and a semiopen 
strategy increases it by 5 percentage points, both of them compared to a closed 
strategy12. 
 
11 Coefficients from pooled regression are 30%-50% higher (see table 5). We also tried fixed effects 
regression (not reported, but available upon request). Results are qualitatively similar, although the 
value of the coefficient is reduced to 0.27 for open strategies and 0.12 for semiopen strategies, still 
different from zero (p-values of 0.001 and 0.028, respectively). 
12 Again, pool regression shows higher and significant values for the coefficients: (0.10 and 0.08) and 
fixed effects panel shows lower values (0.06 and 0.03), for open and semiopen strategies, respectively. 
 PANEL POOL QUANTILE REGRESSION 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
 Single Equation First Part Second Part Single Equation First Part Second Part Quantile (.50) Quantile (.70) Quantile (.90) 
 Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.22*** (0.05) 0.05*** (0.01) -0.02 (0.04) 0.34*** (0.06) 0.08*** (0.01) -0.03 (0.05) 1.01*** (0.05) 0.23*** (0.05) 0.01 (0.04) 
OPEN 0.40*** (0.07) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.07 (0.05) 0.52*** (0.09) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.05 (0.06) 1.26*** (0.08) 0.39*** (0.07) 0.13* (0.06) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.14 (0.13) 0.02 (0.02) 0.13 (0.13) -0.08 (0.19) -0.03 (0.03) 0.12 (0.20) -0.07 (0.16) -0.12 (0.14) 0.34** (0.12) 
LSIZE -0.43*** (0.11) -0.05** (0.02) -0.38*** (0.08) -0.58*** (0.11) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.45*** (0.08) -0.86*** (0.09) -0.80*** (0.08) -0.33*** (0.07) 
LSIZE2 0.05*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.02** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 
RD_INT 0.07*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.02** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.38*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 
LT -0.33** (0.10) -0.04 (0.02) -0.24** (0.08) -0.27* (0.11) -0.02 (0.02) -0.24** (0.08) -0.39*** (0.08) -0.32*** (0.07) -0.07 (0.06) 
LMT -0.27** (0.10) -0.04* (0.02) -0.12 (0.08) -0.18 (0.11) -0.02 (0.02) -0.14 (0.08) -0.34*** (0.08) -0.23** (0.07) -0.01 (0.06) 
MHT -0.23* (0.09) -0.03 (0.02) -0.12 (0.07) -0.19 (0.10) -0.02 (0.02) -0.12 (0.07) -0.37*** (0.08) -0.12 (0.07) -0.11 (0.06) 
EXPORT 0.08 (0.07) 0.02 (0.01) -0.06 (0.05) 0.11 (0.08) 0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.06) 0.08 (0.07) 0.00 (0.06) -0.03 (0.05) 
OBS_COST 0.19* (0.08) 0.01 (0.02) 0.22** (0.07) 0.08 (0.11) -0.02 (0.02) 0.27*** (0.08) -0.04 (0.09) 0.17* (0.08) 0.22** (0.07) 
OBS_INF 0.07 (0.10) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.08) 0.09 (0.13) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.10) 0.21 (0.11) -0.02 (0.10) -0.15 (0.09) 
GROUP 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.01) -0.06 (0.05) -0.05 (0.07) -0.00 (0.01) -0.06 (0.05) -0.05 (0.06) -0.07 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
O=S 8.13** 7.12** 3.42 4.59* 2.81 1.69 11.21*** 5.63* 4.14* 
O=U 3.44 4.47* 0.22 8.93** 12.39*** 0.10 61.41*** 11.72*** 2.44 
S=U 0.38 0.96 1.49 4.70* 8.31 0.52 44.28*** 6.14* 6.72** 
n 16906  16906  9917  16,906 16,906 16,906 
Chi2 323.70 208.70 775.28       
F    19.37 14.90 33.70    
22 
Table 5. Results of the main regressions. Dependent variable: LNEWMK 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; S=SEMIOPEN; O=OPEN; U=ULTRAOPEN. 
 
However, the second part of the two part model does not show any significant 
difference across strategies. We explore this second finding by using quantile 
regression methods (columns VII-IX), which provides a more detailed view. When 
these methods are applied, the general results hold for the different points in the 
distribution: coefficients of an open strategy are always the highest and a semiopen 
strategy is shown to be better than a closed strategy for LI and MI points. The only 
exception being HI points where semiopen and closed strategies show similar 
effects13. 
The results for an ultraopen strategy need to be discussed separately, since they are 
less stable owing to the lower number of firms adopting this strategy. Panel data 
single equation (column I) does not reveal a significant effect for this strategy, while 
the pooled regression (column IV) shows that its coefficient is not different from zero, 
but significantly lower than for open and semiopen strategies. The quantile 
regressions provide more detail. An ultraopen strategy provides poorer performance 
for LI and MI than an open or semiopen strategy, but for HI better performance than 
a semiopen or a closed strategy. 
5.2. Robustness checks and further results 
As already mentioned in Section 3, we cannot derive a consensus from the results of 
the various studies reviewed because of the different definitions of the dependent 
variables, the different methodologies and the different samples. Our main 
regressions in Table 5 show that our results are robust to the choice of different 
methodologies. In this section, we look at whether the results change significantly if 
the dependent variable is defined differently or if subgroups of firms are considered. 
                                                
13 Note that the value of the coefficients decreases sharply as we move up along the distribution. This is 
due to the fact that the for LI points even a small absolute increase is very high in percentage, while for 
HI points, a high increase is simply not feasible (because the original variable is a percentage). 
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5.2.1. Different dependent variables 
Table 6 reports the results using two different indicators for the dependent variable.  
First, we use the log of sales of products new to the market on number of employees 
(LNEWMK_E). This is the indicator used by Frenz and Ietto-Gilles (2009) and 
benefits from not being right censored, eliminating distortion caused by single 
product firms with 100% sales, and avoiding the accumulation of the distribution in 
round numbers, such as 5%, 10% or 20%. 
Second, we apply a logarithmic transformation, LTNEWMK=log(newmk/(1-newmk)), 
where newmk is the sales per unit due to new-to-the-market products and the zero 
values are converted to 0.0001 and 100% becomes 0.9999. This is the indicator 
used by Klomp and van Leuween (2001), Mohnen et al. (2006) and Raymond et al. 
(2006) and benefits from being closer to a normal distribution and being symmetric. 
The results using LNEWMK_E are essentially the same as the main results. An open 
strategy gives the highest payoff and a semiopen strategy is better than a closed 
one. These results are highly significant and hold for the single equation model, with 
panel and pooled data14. When this dependent variable is used, the second part of 
the two-part model shows that a closed strategy performs the worst. The pattern for 
the quantile regression is the same as for the single equation model in all the points 
of the distribution analysed except for the finding that there is no significant difference 
between an open and a semiopen strategy for LI and MI. The results for an ultraopen 
strategy are similar than those from table 5. An ultraopen strategy is worse than an 
open or a semiopen strategy for LI and MI and better than any other strategy for HI 
(although the difference in the coefficients is not significant compared to an open 
strategy). 
14 Logically, the first part would be unaffected by changes in the definition of the dependent variable. 
 PANEL POOL QUANTILE 
 Single Equation Second Part Single Equation Second Part Quantile (.50) Quantile (.70) Quantile (..9) 
LNEWMK_E Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.53*** (0.09) 0.10 (0.05) 0.80*** (0.12) 0.12* (0.06) 1.48*** (0.12) 0.41*** (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 
OPEN 0.86*** (0.13) 0.21** (0.08) 1.08*** (0.16) 0.16* (0.08) 1.67*** (0.17) 0.39*** (0.07) 0.24*** (0.06) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.34 (0.26) 0.38* (0.18) -0.09 (0.37) 0.35 (0.26) -0.44 (0.36) -0.01 (0.16) 0.35** (0.13) 
Open=Semiopen 7.48** 2.44 3.05 0.30 1.28 0.06 6.68** 
Ultraopen=Open 3.69 0.92 9.41* 0.48 31.41*** 5.93* 0.63 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.55 2.60 5.80* 0.76 28.47*** 7.15** 4.27* 
n 16906 9917 16906 9917 16906 16906 16906 
Wald Chi / F 372.14 1193.46 20.67 27.57    
LTNEWMK Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.33*** (0.09) -0.11 (0.09) 0.52*** (0.11) -0.13 (0.10) 1.18*** (0.08) 0.28*** (0.06) -0.02 (0.11) 
OPEN 0.71*** (0.12) 0.12 (0.12) 0.87*** (0.16) 0.07 (0.14) 1.49*** (0.11) 0.46*** (0.08) 0.34* (0.15) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.49* (0.25) 0.76** (0.28) 0.20 (0.40) 0.96* (0.49) -0.12 (0.23) -0.08 (0.16) 1.47*** (0.31) 
Open=Semiopen 10.58** 4.53* 5.67* 2.53 8.06** 5.32* 6.00* 
Ultraopen=Open 0.68 4.88* 2.68 3.21 43.26*** 10.03** 11.49*** 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.41 9.75** 0.65 5.03* 31.06*** 5.01* 22.10*** 
n 16906 9917 16906 9917 16906 16906 16906 
Wald Chi / F 273.58 544.18 15.53 24.33    
25 
Table 6. Results of main regression with different dependent variables 
a significant at 0.01 level, b significant at 0.05 level;  
 
 
The results using LTNEWMK follow the same main pattern and there are no 
qualitative differences between the panel and pooled data for the main equation. The 
second part or the two-part model does not show any significant difference across 
strategies. When quantile regression is used, results follow exactly the same pattern 
as those with the original indicator. Results for an ultraopen strategy are different 
when this indicator is used. This strategy shows the highest coefficient in the second 
part of the two-part model, with panel and pooled data. These results are probably 
driven by the transformation of the dependent variable, imposing symmetry and 
making observations in the tails more distant. This impression is corroborated by the 
quantile regression, whose results follow exactly the same pattern as those with the 
original indicator. 
5.2.2. Regression by groups. Size 
Table 7 reports the results of the main set of regressions for different groups of firms, 
based on size: firms with less than 30 employees (small firms), firms with 30 to 100 
employees (medium firms) and firms with more than 100 employees (large firms). 
The cut off points were chosen to obtain groups of similar sample size. 
The main results hold for the different groups of firms. For each of them, both an 
open strategy and a semiopen strategy have higher coefficients than a closed 
strategy in the single equation model and in the first part whether panel or pooled 
data are used. In addition, the coefficient of open is always higher than the coefficient 
of semiopen, although differences are sometimes non significant, due to the smaller 
sample size.  
These results mainly hold for the quantile regressions, although there are some 
minor differences: For small firms, open and semiopen strategies show a similar 
effect for HI, and for medium sized firms, semiopen strategies show a higher 
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coefficient than open strategies for MI. Finally, an ultraopen strategy is still the best 
for HI. 
5.2.3. Regression by groups. Sector 
Table 8 reports the results by sector following the OECD (2005) classification.  
The main results hold for the different groups of sectors. For each of them, open and 
semiopen strategies show significantly higher coefficients than a closed strategy in 
the single equation and the first part models and with panel or pooled data. The 
coefficient of an open strategy is always higher than the coefficient of a semiopen 
one, although differences are sometimes non significant, due to the smaller sample 
size.  
Concerning the second part, no significant differences emerge across strategies, 
except for high tech sectors, where an open strategy has a higher coefficient than 
closed and semiopen for both the panel and pooled data. The quantile regressions 
show the same pattern of general regression for LI and MI. The only difference is that 
an open strategy is only shown to be better than the all the other strategies for HI 
among LMT firms. Finally, an ultraopen strategy is the best strategy for HI only for 
firms in the MHT sectors. 
 
Table 7. Results of main regressions by size of the firm 
 PANEL POOL QUANTILE (POOL) 
 Single 
Equation First Part Second Part 
Single 
Equation First Part Second Part 
Quantile (.50) Quantile (.70) Quantile (.90) 
Small Firms Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.27** (0.08) 0.05** (0.02) 0.01 (0.06) 0.48*** (0.11) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.11 (0.08) 1.21*** (0.19) 0.36*** (0.08) 0.16* (0.06) 
OPEN 0.57*** (0.12) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.10 (0.08) 0.66*** (0.15) 0.12*** (0.03) 0.12 (0.10) 1.60*** (0.25) 0.54*** (0.11) 0.15 (0.09) 
ULTRAOPEN -0.24 (0.25) -0.04 (0.05) 0.11 (0.23) -0.58 (0.32) -0.14* (0.05) 0.39 (0.31) -0.70 (0.57) -0.76** (0.25) 0.24 (0.18) 
Open=Semiopen 6.34* 7.49** 1.11 1.43 1.40 0.02 2.09 2.52 0.02 
Ultraopen=Open 9.09** 9.49** 0.00 13.66*** 20.07*** 0.73 14.60*** 23.86*** 0.22 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 3.96* 3.84 0.18 10.32** 16.06*** 0.85 10.89** 18.92*** 0.18 
n 5,465 5,465 3,110 5,465 5,465 3,110 5,465 5,465 5,465 
Medium Firms Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.22** (0.08) 0.06*** (0.01) -0.09 (0.06) 0.29** (0.10) 0.07*** (0.02) -0.10 (0.08) 1.11*** (0.10) 0.16* (0.07) -0.05 (0.06) 
OPEN 0.34** (0.12) 0.08*** (0.02) -0.04 (0.10) 0.42** (0.15) 0.11*** (0.03) -0.14 (0.12) 1.24*** (0.15) 0.08 (0.11) 0.25** (0.09) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.18 (0.22) 0.04 (0.04) 0.09 (0.22) -0.06 (0.30) -0.03 (0.06) 0.15 (0.29) -0.07 (0.29) -0.09 (0.21) 0.41* (0.18) 
Open=Semiopen 1.04 1.34 0.38 0.78 1.37 0.11 0.65 0.56 9.94** 
Ultraopen=Open 0.42 1.13 0.31 2.15 5.08* 0.86 17.71*** 0.54 0.61 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.03 0.29 0.71 1.23 3.16 0.70 16.52*** 1.38 6.26* 
n 5,798 5,798 3,280 5,798 5,798 3,280 5,798 5,798 5,798 
Large Firms Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.26** (0.08) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05 (0.07) 0.26* (0.10) 0.07** (0.02) -0.05 (0.08) 0.81*** (0.15) 0.18* (0.07) -0.07 (0.08) 
OPEN 0.39*** (0.11) 0.07** (0.02) 0.19 (0.10) 0.43** (0.14) 0.08** (0.03) 0.11 (0.11) 1.04*** (0.21) 0.39*** (0.09) 0.12 (0.11) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.46* (0.23) 0.07 (0.04) 0.20 (0.22) 0.35 (0.34) 0.09 (0.06) -0.04 (0.35) 0.50 (0.44) 0.33 (0.20) 0.75** (0.23) 
Open=Semiopen 1.91 0.90 2.68 1.67 0.36 2.63 1.41 5.84* 3.19 
Ultraopen=Open 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.20 1.31 0.07 6.57* 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.75 0.24 0.50 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.47 0.60 12.32*** 
n 5,643 5,643 3,527 5,643 5,643 3,527 5,643 5,643 5,643 
a significant at 0.01 level, b significant at 0.05 level;  
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 PANEL POOL QUANTILE (POOL) 
 Single 
Equation First Part Second Part 
Single 
Equation First Part Second Part 
Quantile (.50) Quantile (.70) Quantile (.90) 
LT Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.25** (0.09) 0.05** (0.02) 0.03 (0.08) 0.40*** (0.12) 0.09*** (0.02) -0.01 (0.09) 1.61*** (0.18) 0.33** (0.12) -0.03 (0.09) 
OPEN 0.44*** (0.13) 0.11*** (0.02) -0.07 (0.11) 0.42* (0.17) 0.10** (0.03) -0.10 (0.13) 1.55*** (0.25) 0.30 (0.16) -0.06 (0.12) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.31 (0.24) 0.06 (0.04) -0.12 (0.23) -0.13 (0.32) -0.03 (0.06) -0.03 (0.36) -0.26 (0.48) -0.17 (0.32) 0.14 (0.24) 
Open=Semiopen 2.53 6.92** 0.83 0.01 0.20 0.51 0.07 0.04 0.05 
Ultraopen=Open 0.27 1.13 0.04 2.61 4.28* 0.04 12.47*** 1.88 0.57 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.07 0.95 0.38 2.63 3.69 0.00 14.92*** 2.39 0.46 
n 4,249 4,249 2,429 4,249 4,249 2,429 4,249 4,249 4,249 
LMT Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.25** (0.10) 0.05** (0.02) -0.03 (0.08) 0.36** (0.13) 0.07** (0.02) -0.01 (0.10) 1.16*** (0.20) 0.20 (0.12) 0.12 (0.08) 
OPEN 0.50*** (0.13) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.05 (0.11) 0.61*** (0.17) 0.12*** (0.03) 0.07 (0.14) 1.60*** (0.26) 0.46** (0.15) 0.41*** (0.11) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.03 (0.23) -0.01 (0.04) 0.22 (0.22) -0.24 (0.30) -0.06 (0.06) 0.23 (0.25) -0.09 (0.47) -0.36 (0.28) 0.12 (0.20) 
Open=Semiopen 4.22* 3.73 0.76 2.43 2.07 0.38 2.85 2.97 6.52** 
Ultraopen=Open 3.74 5.58* 0.54 6.93** 8.80** 0.33 10.92** 7.39** 1.70 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.92 2.18 1.26 3.67 5.35* 0.84 6.67** 3.79 0.00 
n 3,916 3,916 2,238 3,916 3,916 2,238 3,916 3,916 3,916 
MHT Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.18* (0.07) 0.04** (0.01) -0.05 (0.06) 0.29** (0.10) 0.07*** (0.02) -0.10 (0.07) 0.89*** (0.15) 0.21** (0.07) 0.04 (0.08) 
OPEN 0.27* (0.11) 0.05** (0.02) 0.07 (0.09) 0.52*** (0.14) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.07 (0.10) 1.28*** (0.23) 0.35*** (0.10) 0.18 (0.11) 
ULTRAOPEN -0.07 (0.26) -0.03 (0.05) 0.42 (0.25) -0.05 (0.44) -0.05 (0.07) 0.48 (0.39) -0.27 (0.54) 0.00 (0.25) 0.92*** (0.25) 
Open=Semiopen 0.74 0.45 1.79 2.76 0.93 3.23 2.97 1.72 1.80 
Ultraopen=Open 1.58 2.80 1.92 1.61 4.30* 1.11 7.35** 1.73 7.56** 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.92 2.16 3.59 0.70 3.16 2.22 4.46* 0.68 11.90*** 
n 6,578 6,578 3,873 6,578 6,578 3,873 6,578 6,578 6,578 
HT Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
SEMIOPEN 0.32* (0.14) 0.07** (0.02) 0.03 (0.10) 0.42* (0.19) 0.07* (0.03) 0.13 (0.13) 0.62** (0.21) 0.27* (0.13) -0.09 (0.08) 
OPEN 0.63** (0.20) 0.08* (0.04) 0.39** (0.15) 0.77** (0.27) 0.11* (0.05) 0.35* (0.17) 0.87** (0.31) 0.50* (0.20) 0.01 (0.11) 
ULTRAOPEN 0.62 (0.49) 0.19* (0.09) -0.11 (0.35) 0.49 (0.67) 0.19 (0.12) -0.49 (0.63) 0.37 (0.77) 0.17 (0.49) -0.42 (0.24) 
Open=Semiopen 3.00 0.07 7.92** 2.15 0.86 2.57 0.71 1.48 1.06 
Ultraopen=Open 0.00 1.43 2.00 0.18 0.41 1.75 0.39 0.40 3.02 
Ultraopen=Semiopen 0.39 1.78 0.16 0.01 0.99 0.98 0.11 0.04 1.90 
n 2,163 2,163 1,377 2,163 2,163 1,377 2,163 2,163 2,163 
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Table 8. Results of main regressions by sector 
a significant at 0.01 level, b significant at 0.05 level;  
 
6. Discussion of results 
We see that the majority of the analysed firms (around 85%) use a closed or 
semiopen strategy to innovate, as predicted by the transaction costs and 
competences approaches. The tendency for open innovation has not increased in 
recent years. However, we found that an open strategy provides higher payoffs in 
terms of product innovation than semiopen or closed strategies, with the last 
performing worst. This result is very robust and holds with different estimation 
methods, dependent variable definitions and sample groups. More precisely, it holds 
for firms of different sizes and for firms from different sectors, thus providing empirical 
proof of the generalizability of the open innovation approach. This result provides 
empirical evidence to the debate about the differential effect of openness on firms of 
different sizes (see e.g., Veugelers, 1998; Nieto and Santamaría, 2010) and on firms 
from different sectors (see e.g. Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; Santamaría et al., 
2009). 
Parametric estimations produce the same results also for the likelihood of new to the 
market products, but do not distinguish between the effects of different strategies on 
sales of these products. Quantile regression methods allow more in depth 
investigation of this issue, and show that for low and medium innovation intensity 
points in the distribution (fifth and seventh decile), the general pattern holds and that 
it is only for the high innovation intensity points (ninth decile) where there is generally 
no significant difference among semiopen and closed strategies, being both of them 
worse than an open strategy. An ultraopen strategy has the highest coefficient for 
this decile and the lower for the rest. However, due to the small number of firms that 
adopt this strategy, results for ultraopen strategies should be considered with 
caution. 
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This work has several limitations. First, we analyse the impact of an open strategy on 
R&D performers only. However, many firms not performing R&D are innovative and 
use an open strategy (Hall et al., 2009; Ortega-Argilés et al., 2009; Santamaría et al., 
2009; Barge-Gil et al., 2011a). However, the characteristics of our database do not 
allow us to include these firms. Second, we analyse the effect of open strategy only 
on product innovation. However, an open strategy can have an effect on process or 
organizational innovation. Our data do not provide a measure of how much process 
innovation is obtained or how organizational innovation is achieved. Third, it is 
possible that products developed using different strategies have different life cycles, 
yielding different levels of sales over different time spans. Implicitly, our analysis 
assumes that this is not the case. Fourth, as Jaffe (2008) highlights, we are analysing 
average rather than marginal effects so that there is no evidence that former closed 
or semiopen innovators will achieve the same results as current ones. Related to 
this, it could be argued that choices are endogenous and some non-observable 
factors are affecting strategic choice and innovation performance. However, 
utilization of panel data alleviates, to some extent, this problem. Fifth, it is likely that 
many firms use a mix of strategies, open for some projects, semi-open for others and 
closed for others. Unfortunately, we can only measure the openness of an entire firm, 
but analysis of project data would provide complementary and very interesting 
additional information. Sixth, we focus on formal inbound open strategies. However, 
we would point out that formal links are the results of strategic choice while informal 
relationships are not (Bodas-Freitas et al, 2010). Finally, our analysis applies only to 
the Spanish case. Although existing studies do not provide specific results for Spain 
(Griffith et al., 2006; Abramovsky et al., 2009) on the relationship between innovation 
and productivity or the determinants of cooperation, evidence from other countries 
would be useful.  
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Despite these limitations, we believe that this study adds to the knowledge on the 
effect of different degrees of openness for firms` innovation performance, a topic of 
increasing interest to academics, managers and policy-makers. We show that an 
open strategy produces higher payoffs than a semiopen one, which in turn produces 
higher payoffs than a closed strategy for product innovation performance.  
This leaves the important question of why firms do not more frequently use an open 
strategy. This is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it should be remembered 
that we analyse the benefits of open strategy and not whether it is more costly for 
firms. Several studies highlight that the costs of search and coordination can be very 
high (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Lazzaroti and Mancini, 2009; Huizingh, 2010) so that 
this could be one explanation. However, an alternative explanation would be that 
many firms overestimate the costs of openness before they try it. The empirical 
evidence suggests that there are clear barriers to adopt open innovation strategies 
since some empirical facts are: (i) firms collaborate in two projects rather than one 
(Fontana et al., 2006); (ii) public initiatives to fund collaboration are unlikely to motive 
firms with no history of involvement in some kind of partnership (Vence, 1998; Heijs, 
2005); and (iii) the existence of a previous relationship (with any different agent) is a 
good indicator of the establishment of a new relationship (Love and Roper, 2001). 
This evidence could be explained by transactions costs as well as cultural factors 
(Dodgson et al., 2006; Elmiquist et al., 2009) or also by simply “lack of awareness” of 
the existence of better management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). The 
process involved in firms becoming open is a very important research topic (Chiaroni 
et al., 2009; Elmquist et al., 2009; Bianchi et al., 2010).  
From a policy point of view it would seem crucial to know how to help firms to 
become open. There is no easy answer and encouraging openness from outside is a 
difficult task (Massa and Testa, 2008; Tomlinson, 2010). However, it is also clear that 
standard policy tools (such as subsidies) are not very effective (Vence, 1998; Heijs, 
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2005). Indirect measures might be more successful than direct ones (Lambrecht and 
Pirnay, 2005; Vega-Jurado et al., 2008; Barge-Gil, 2010a). For example, 
demonstrations of the benefits of openness or the existence of suitable partners 
(such as technology institutes) or environments (such as technology parks) (Barge-
Gil et al., 2011b; Vasquez-Urriago et al., 2011). An examination of the different policy 
tools that could be used to encourage firm openness would be an important line for 
future research. 
Concluding remarks 
Our objective was to analyse the relationship between openness and innovation 
performance, testing the predictions of different theoretical approaches: transactions 
costs, competences and open innovation. We defined four degrees of openness: 
closed, semiopen, open, and ultraopen. This line of research is important because 
the different theoretical approaches reach different conclusions and empirical 
evidence from large databases has been inconclusive so far. 
The choices made by the firms in our sample support transaction costs and 
competence approaches since most of the firms (around 85%) are shown to be either 
closed or semiopen innovators. We observed no tendency for open innovation. 
The results for the impact of the different strategies provide a very different picture. 
An open strategy performs better than a semiopen strategy, which in turn performs 
better than a closed strategy, when sales of new-to-the-market products are 
analyzed. This result is robust to different estimation methods and different 
indicators. It is also quite general and holds for firms of different sizes or from 
different sectors. When the volume of sales from new to the market products is 
analysed using parametric techniques the results are less clear and the effects of the 
different strategies are found to be very similar. However, a quantile regression 
technique enables a more detailed approach and shows that the main results hold for 
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the points in the distribution characterized by different innovation intensities (fifth, 
seventh and ninth deciles, respectively). It is only for the high innovation intensity 
point (ninth decile) where differences between semiopen and closed strategies 
become non-significant. 
Thus, our main findings highlight an apparent paradox: open strategies yield higher 
payoffs but are used by a small minority firms. To understand why would be a very 
interesting line for future research. 
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